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In the United States, exploitation of shale gas resources through a technology called hydraulic fracturing (‘fracking’)
started an energy revolution from the early 2000s onwards.
Fracking is now widely used across several major shale gas ‘plays’ (formations): most importantly, the Marcellus
Shale of Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia (see Figure 1). The surge in shale gas production has made the
United States the largest natural gas producer in the world. What are the implications for US manufacturing?
Figure 1. Unconventional oil and gas wells across the United States (red dots) and shale
plays (light grey)
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Source: Fetzer (2014)
What standard trade analysis predicts
Our research starts from the premise that natural gas is predominantly used for energy production, so that the
sudden increase in gas supply puts considerable downward pressure on energy prices. In an open economy, any
such price differential vis-à-vis other countries would be arbitraged away through international trade in natural gas.
But natural gas is not a normal commodity in this respect: its physical properties make transport exceedingly
expensive over long distances.
In addition, up until December 2015, the United States enforced an export ban on crude oil and natural gas.
Consequently, any ‘buy-cheap-sell-dear’ activities were difficult. This has resulted in a dramatic drop in natural gas
prices in the United States vis-à-vis other countries (see Figure 2).
Industries differ significantly in their inherent technological energy intensities. For example, around 10% of the
overall input costs for ‘chemical manufacturing’ and ‘primary metal manufacturing’ constitutes energy costs, while
the nondurable consumer goods energy cost share is less than 5%.
As a consequence, firms that manufacture energy-intensive products experienced a much more substantial cut in
production costs and, hence, a boost to their competitiveness. We therefore expected that both input (employment
and capital) and output shares of these industries would increase relative to their ‘low-energy’ counterparts.
Turning to international trade, we hypothesised that this differential cost shock would give US firms an edge over
their international competitors: energy-intensive industries should expand their exports more than low-energy ones.
Figure 2. Industrial use natural gas prices in dollars per cubic foot in Europe and the United
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Evidence on the impact of fracking
To elicit the causal impact of fracking on our various outcomes of interest, we compare the development of industries
that are similar and differ only in their energy intensity – providing us with ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups – as
measured by their energy cost shares derived from US input-output tables.
We verify that our two groups behaved similarly prior to the shale gas boom, which gives us confidence in the
validity of this comparison. In addition, we are able to rule out a range of alternative explanations, which leaves us
confident that our estimates capture the causal impact of fracking on our main outcome: exports in energy intensive
output.
The focus of our study is the indirect effect of the shale gas production boom on industrial activity (operating through
natural gas prices), as opposed to the direct stimulus effects due to the drilling activity and the associated local
income and employment gains that have been studied elsewhere. Throughout our empirical analysis, we exclude
direct effects by focusing on areas of the United States that do not lie right on top of or near to shale plays.
We document that output in energy-intensive sectors expands significantly with the widening of the natural gas price
gap. Consistent with that observation, we show that the energy-intensive sectors absorb more capital (measured by
capital expenditure decisions as a proxy) and labour (captured by employment) in order to produce this additional
output.
Turning to trade, the main focus of our study, we document that the increase in the price gap is associated with a
significant expansion in exports of energy-intensive goods. The effect operates at both the ‘intensive margin’ (more
exports in an industry-destination pair that had already been engaged in trade) and the ‘extensive margin’ (emerging
trade in an industry destination pair that had not previously engaged in trade). Contrary to the theoretical prediction,
we find no consistently significant reduction in imports.
The example of chemical manufacturing
The case of chemical manufacturing serves well as an illustration of the effects we estimate. This industry has an
energy cost share of roughly 8% (the overall industry average is 5%) and constitutes a significant part of the US
economy: on average, between 2006 and 2012, chemical manufacturing accounted for almost 20% of overall
manufacturing GDP.
For every dollar increase in the price gap of natural gas between the United States and Europe, output in chemical
manufacturing increased by 1.6%. In the face of nearly a $10 gap by the end of our sample period, this baseline
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result is large. Moreover, we find that employment and gross capital expenditure increased by 0.6% and 3.3%,
respectively, for every dollar price difference.
The shale gas boom provided energyintensive industries with a cost advantage over their international competitors.
We estimate that the value of exports by chemical manufacturing rose by 1.6% for every dollar increase in the
natural gas price gap.
Cross-sector average effects
Using the average sector level employment together with average energy intensity, we can arrive at an overall
estimate of the employment gains: total manufacturing sector employment increased by around 356,000 jobs up to
2012. A comparison with previous research (Feyrer et al, 2015) suggests that, for every two jobs created in direct
relation to fracking, this indirect effect adds more than one additional job elsewhere in the economy.
Even though the United States is considered to be a relatively closed country, it plays an important role on the
international stage as one of the largest exporters. Given that the price gap widened to $10 by 2012, we find that
average manufacturing exports have expanded by roughly 10% due to the shale gas boom. This amounts to roughly
4.4% of the overall value of exports of goods and services from the United States in 2012.
Our results suggest that the cost advantage due to the shale gas boom may have helped the US economy recover
significantly faster than it would otherwise have done after the financial crisis of 2007/08.
Implications for the UK
The UK is set to explore the potential of fracking technology in exploiting its shale gas resources. But it is important
to highlight that there are substantial differences between the UK and the United States, which need to be taken into
account when making any inferences based on our research.
Most importantly, the UK is currently reasonably well integrated into the European energy market, with millions of
customers at its doorstep and infrastructure available to carry natural gas from the UK to continental Europe.
Therefore, it is unlikely that a newly created UK gas supply would have a US-sized effect on natural gas prices –
either domestically or in the European market.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This article appeared originally on CentrePiece, the magazine of LSE’s Centre for Economic
Performance(CE. It summarises the authors’ paper On the Comparative Advantage of US Manufacturing:
Evidence from the Shale Gas Revolution, CEP Discussion Paper No. 1454
The post gives the views of its authors, not the position of LSE Business Review or the London School of
Economics.
Before commenting, please read our Comment Policy.
Rabah Arezki  is Chief of the Commodities Unit in the IMF’s Research Department. He has written
on energy, commodities, international macroeconomics, and development economics. He has led
and participated in various IMF missions in Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Mr. Arezki is
also a non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution and at the University of Oxford. He has
published widely in peer-reviewed journals, co-edited several books and special issues of
academic journals. He is the Editor of the IMF Research Bulletin and an Associate Editor of Revue
d’économie du développement. He obtained his M.Sc. from the Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et
4/5
de l’Administration Economique in Paris, France, and his PhD from the European University Institute, in Florence,
Italy.
Thiemo Fetzer is an Assistant Professor at the University of Warwick and a research associate in
CEP’s urban programme. He mainly works in Development Economics and Political Economy,
with a focus on resource economics and conflict. Twitter @fetzert
 
 
Frank Pisch is a PhD candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He
received his B.Sc. and B.A. in Economics and Philosophy & Economics at the University of
Bayreuth, his M.Phil in Economic Research at the University of Cambridge, and his MRes at the
London School of Economics and Political Science. His research is focused on International Trade
and Labour Economics. He’s an occasional research assistant at LSE’s Centre for Economic
Performance.
Copyright © 2015 London School of Economics
5/5
